Presencia

The Mexican Procurement Law ("LAASSP" by its Spanish acronym) establishes that, by general rule, all governmental acquisitions of goods and services must be procured through public tenders. Only in exceptional situations, it shall be allowed to do said acquisitions through a direct award or a tender restricted by invitation. Nonetheless, according to the LAASSP, public tenders may have three different scopes: (i) national, in which only Mexican suppliers or those which offer goods or services with at least 50% of national content are able to participate; (ii) international under the coverage of treaties, aimed both for national suppliers and foreign ones that belong to a country that has a free trade agreement celebrated with Mexico; and (ii) open international, where national and foreign suppliers may participate regardless of their nationality. In principle, governmental agencies and entities shall prefer a national public tender and only in cases in which it is declared void or other exceptional situations, the scope of the public tender may be broadened by general rule, all governmental acquisitions of goods and services must be procured through public tenders. Only in exceptional situations, it shall be allowed to do said acquisitions through a direct award or a tender restricted by invitation. Nonetheless, according to the LAASSP, public tenders may have three different scopes: (i) national, in which only Mexican suppliers or those which offer goods or services with at least 50% of national content are able to participate; (ii) international under the coverage of treaties, aimed both for national suppliers and foreign ones that belong to a country that has a free trade agreement celebrated with Mexico; and (ii) open international, where national and foreign suppliers may participate regardless of their nationality. In principle, governmental agencies and entities shall prefer a national public tender and only in cases in which it is declared void or other exceptional situations, the scope of the public tender may be broadened

Reform initiative On 10 June 2020 Senator Ricardo Monreal of the National Regeneration Party (MORENA)(1) presented a reform initiative to amend Articles 27 and 28 of the Constitution. Through this reform, Monreal proposed to join (and extinguish) three state organs which he believes share certain powers and competencies – namely, the Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFECE), the Federal Telecommunications Institute (IFT) and the Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE). The resulting organ would be the National Institute of Markets and Competition for Welfare (INMECOB).

In Mexico, jurisdiction over competition and antitrust cases is divided between the Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFECE) and the Federal Telecommunications Institute (IFT). The IFT has jurisdiction in the broadcasting and telecoms sectors, while COFECE oversees all other sectors.

Introduction As the COVID-19 pandemic develops and society and governments respond to it, the restrictions imposed to contain the spread of the virus are having adverse economic effects. On one hand, these restrictions may discourage the investment of capital and the development of new projects; on the other hand, they will also lead to significant losses for many businesses.

COFECE investigation In September 2014 the Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFECE) investigative authority launched an investigation into two polyethylene glove providers for absolute monopolistic practices relating to the Mexican Social Security Institute's acquisition of polyethylene healing materials (specifically, gloves).

On 5 June 2019 the Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFECE) issued a press release announcing that it had rejected Wal-Mart International Holdings, Inc's (Walmart's) proposal to acquire Delivery Technologies, S de RL de CV (Cornershop). According to the press release, the COFECE rejected the acquisition in light of the potential risks that it posed to competition and free market access.

Following the 2013 constitutional energy amendment, the Mexican energy market became a competitive market that allowed private in vestment. In addition, the Hydrocarbon Law, which was issued in January 2015, allows third parties which are unrelated to the state-owned enterprise Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex) to sell gasoline and diesel. In light of these developments, in 2016 the Mexican Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFECE) issued a series of recommendations aimed at fostering competition in the gasoline and diesel markets.

In August 2015 the Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFECE) approved a concentration between Dutch fund Moench Coöperatif, UA and one of the major pharmaceutical product distributors in Mexico, Marzam, through which the former acquired control over the latter. The concentration was approved without commitments, as the COFECE was advised that Moench Coöperatif did not participate in the same market as Marzam and thus that there was no overlap between the agents involved.

On 17 July 2018 the Federal Competition Commission (FECC) issued its Competition Agenda for Public Procurement, in which it presented its findings regarding competition issues that arise during the public procurement process. In the agenda, the FECC also proposed certain courses of action (both administrative and legislative) to promote effective competition in public procurement.