Descubre nuestra presencia en los medios a través de artículos, publicaciones y entrevistas que destacan nuestro compromiso y liderazgo en la industria.
Reform initiative
On 10 June 2020 Senator Ricardo Monreal of the National Regeneration Party (MORENA)(1)
presented a reform initiative to amend Articles 27 and 28 of the Constitution. Through this reform,
Monreal proposed to join (and extinguish) three state organs which he believes share certain powers
and competencies namely, the Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFECE), the Federal
Telecommunications Institute (IFT) and the Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE). The resulting
organ would be the National Institute of Markets and Competition for Welfare (INMECOB).
In Mexico, jurisdiction over competition and antitrust cases is divided between the Federal
Economic Competition Commission (COFECE) and the Federal Telecommunications Institute (IFT).
The IFT has jurisdiction in the broadcasting and telecoms sectors, while COFECE oversees all other
sectors.
Introduction
As the COVID-19 pandemic develops and society and governments respond to it, the restrictions
imposed to contain the spread of the virus are having adverse economic effects. On one hand, these
restrictions may discourage the investment of capital and the development of new projects; on the
other hand, they will also lead to significant losses for many businesses.
COFECE investigation
In September 2014 the Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFECE) investigative authority launched an investigation into two polyethylene glove providers for absolute monopolistic practices relating to the Mexican Social Security Institute's acquisition of polyethylene healing materials (specifically, gloves).
On 5 June 2019 the Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFECE) issued a press release
announcing that it had rejected Wal-Mart International Holdings, Inc's (Walmart's) proposal to
acquire Delivery Technologies, S de RL de CV (Cornershop).
According to the press release, the COFECE rejected the acquisition in light of the potential risks that
it posed to competition and free market access.
Following the 2013 constitutional energy amendment, the Mexican energy market became a competitive market that allowed private in vestment. In addition, the Hydrocarbon Law, which was issued in January 2015, allows third parties which are unrelated to the state-owned enterprise Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex) to sell gasoline and diesel. In light of these developments, in 2016 the Mexican Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFECE) issued a series of recommendations aimed at fostering competition in the gasoline and diesel markets.
In August 2015 the Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFECE) approved a concentration
between Dutch fund Moench Coöperatif, UA and one of the major pharmaceutical product
distributors in Mexico, Marzam, through which the former acquired control over the latter. The
concentration was approved without commitments, as the COFECE was advised that Moench
Coöperatif did not participate in the same market as Marzam and thus that there was no overlap
between the agents involved.
On 17 July 2018 the Federal Competition Commission (FECC) issued its Competition Agenda for
Public Procurement, in which it presented its findings regarding competition issues that arise during
the public procurement process. In the agenda, the FECC also proposed certain courses of action
(both administrative and legislative) to promote effective competition in public procurement.
On December 8 2016 the First Collegiate Tribunal on Administrative Matters Specialised in Economic
Competition, Broadcasting and Telecommunications recognised the concept of attorney-client
privilege and the attorney-client work product doctrine in an antitrust context for the first time (for
further details please see "Courts recognise attorney-client privilege in antitrust matter for first
time"). However, the tribunal's ruling was non-binding and could be used by specialised judges only
as a guide.
In January 2017 the Federal Economic Competition Commission (FECC) issued its Annual Working Plan. In it, the FECC recognised that one of its strategic goals is to communicate to economic agents
how anti-competitive practices will be investigated and which actions agents may adopt to prevent
potential risks. In particular, the FECC declared that one of its goals for 2017 would be to launch a
project to develop guidelines for the analysis of collaboration agreements between competitors.
According to the FECC, this project will:
l clarify key concepts on the subject;
l collect best practices on the analysis of collaboration agreements among competitors;
l indicate specific criteria to identify the activities that should be investigated; and
l highlight collaboration agreements that may be considered collusive.